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BRIDGING THE GAP:  ASSESSING THE STATE OF 
FEDERAL CORRUPTION LAW AFTER KELLY V. 
UNITED STATES 
Michael J. Morgan* 
 
Political corruption in the United States has become more and more 
prevalent in recent years.  These days it seems difficult to turn on the news 
without hearing accusations of a public official caught in a scandal.  Despite 
the frequency of the corrupt acts, however, the federal government remains 
largely unable to hold state actors accountable. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently overturned federal convictions 
of state officials charged with committing corrupt acts.  The issue in these 
cases is not the lack of corruption or proof of the acts but rather, the lack of 
laws that adequately criminalize the corrupt conduct.  As a result, the same 
corrupt actions being publicly denounced in the news are being excused in 
the justice system. 
This Note examines the Court’s recent corruption cases and analyzes the 
rationales behind them.  This Note then applies this analysis to Kelly v. 
United States, the most recent case in the federal corruption saga, to evaluate 
where the Court stands on federal corruption. 
Ultimately, this Note concludes that, in Kelly, the Court is sending a clear 
message to Congress:  amend the corruption laws to properly cover the 
conduct.  It then proposes an amended version of the current law that takes 
into account the analysis of Kelly and other federal corruption cases. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On September 9, 2013, high-ranking New Jersey officials ordered workers 
for the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (“Port Authority”) to 
shut down two lanes of the George Washington Bridge.1  The three rush-hour 
lanes, which for decades had eased the flow of traffic out of Fort Lee, New 
Jersey, were abruptly reduced to a single lane.2  Officials from the Port 
Authority cautioned against this, but the state responded that it was 
conducting a traffic study and that the Port Authority should not warn Fort 
Lee officials or police officers.3 
The abrupt closure of the world’s busiest bridge caused a public safety 
disaster.  Motorists trying to enter Manhattan gridlocked Fort Lee.4  On a 
week that included the first day of school, Yom Kippur, and the anniversary 
of the September 11 terrorist attacks, car-clogged streets brought Fort Lee to 
a standstill.5  Traffic blocked emergency vehicles from responding to a heart 
 
 1. Kate Zernike, The Bridge Scandal, Explained, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/04/nyregion/george-washington-bridge-scandal-what-
you-need-to-know.html [https://perma.cc/4MQH-SMFY]. 
 2. See Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565, 1568 (2020). 
 3. See Zernike, supra note 1. 
 4. Adam Liptak & Nick Corasaniti, Supreme Court Unanimously Overturns 
‘Bridgegate’ Convictions, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05 
/07/us/supreme-court-bridgegate.html [https://perma.cc/X7AU-F3C3]. 
 5. See Zernike, supra note 1. 
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attack victim6 and left school buses parked in the streets for hours.7  Half-
hour commutes turned into four-hour nightmares.8 
As Fort Lee mayor Mark Sokolich scrambled to contain the chaos erupting 
in his city, he contacted Port Authority deputy executive director Bill Baroni 
and pleaded for help.9  One of his countless unanswered voicemails asked a 
simple, but glaring question:  “Who’s mad at me?”10 
The answer was Bridget Anne Kelly, deputy chief of staff to then New 
Jersey governor Chris Christie.11  What they portrayed as a “traffic study” 
was truly the result of a multilevel abuse of power aimed at punishing Fort 
Lee’s Democratic mayor in what would soon become known as 
“Bridgegate.”12 
Upset that Sokolich had refused to endorse Chris Christie’s reelection 
campaign, Kelly had reached out to Baroni to retaliate.13  They planned to 
purposely close the Fort Lee rush-hour lanes to “‘creat[e] a traffic jam that 
would punish’ Mayor Sokolich and ‘send him a message.’”14  The resulting 
traffic catastrophe lasted for four days, only coming to an end when the Port 
Authority executive director discovered Kelly and Baroni’s “abusive 
decision” and reversed it.15 
Federal prosecutors charged Baroni and Kelly with wire fraud under 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 666(a)(1)(A).16  The jury found both of them guilty on 
all counts.17  The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting Baroni and Kelly’s claim 
that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions.18  At a 
minimum, the circuit court held, Kelly and Baroni violated the wire fraud 
statute by depriving the Port Authority of the value of public employee 
labor.19  The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed.  In May 2020, the Court 
reversed the Third Circuit’s decision in Kelly v. United States.20  The Court 
held that a bridge closing scheme aimed at punishing a political adversary 
did not violate federal corruption laws.21 
 
 6. See Kelly, 140 S. Ct. at 1570. 
 7. See Zernike, supra note 1. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See Kate Zernike & Noah Remnick, Fort Lee Officials Recall Chaos and Turmoil as 
Lanes to Bridge Were Closed, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2016/09/21/nyregion/fort-lee-police-chief-recalls-chaos-and-turmoil-as-bridge-lanes-were-
closed.html [https://perma.cc/BZ3G-B2UZ]. 
 11. See Kelly, 140 S. Ct. at 1570. 
 12. See id. at 1569. 
 13. See id. 
 14. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Joint Appendix (Volume I of II) at 254, Kelly, 140 
S. Ct. 1565 (No. 18-1059)). 
 15. Id. at 1570. 
 16. Id. at 1568, 1571. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See United States v. Baroni, 909 F.3d 550, 562 (3d Cir. 2018), rev’d and remanded 
sub nom. Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565. 
 19. See id. 
 20. 140 S. Ct. 1565 (2020). 
 21. See id. at 1569. 
2342 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
Kelly is only the latest case exemplifying the Supreme Court’s 
commitment to narrowly interpreting federal laws targeting corruption.22  It 
is a familiar script:  political actors do something widely recognized as 
corrupt and wrongful.23  They are prosecuted for their corruption and 
convicted for using their offices and powers for their personal benefit.  In 
doing so, they directly harm the very public they represent.  Yet, under 
current federal laws, their acts are not criminal because those laws were not 
written to capture the misconduct. 
The Court’s consistent unwillingness to uphold federal corruption 
convictions could be the Court accepting this as the new normal—that even 
corrupt politicians cannot be regulated by federal laws.24  If so, there is 
concern that the Court is entrenching corruption and bribery in the political 
system.25  However, the Court may actually be alerting lawmakers to 
shortcomings in federal corruption statutes.  Kelly appears to be an attempt 
to do this. 
This Note seeks to clarify how the federal government should approach 
corruption laws.  Part I investigates landmark federal corruption cases and 
how the Court has interpreted Congress’s ambiguous legislative efforts to 
fight corruption.  Part II discusses the different concepts and rationales 
behind the Court’s decisions.  Part III then applies the rationales to Kelly and 
recommends that Congress amend the honest services statute, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1346, to define “honest services” with reference to state law. 
I.  FOUNDATIONAL BEARINGS:  BACKGROUND AND LEGAL CONTEXT 
This part discusses the necessary background information concerning 
corruption legislation in the United States.  Part I.A provides a brief 
description of the meaning of corruption.  Part I.B summarizes the history of 
federal corruption law and the landmark cases that define it.  Part I.C then 
discusses Congress’s previous efforts to solve the federal corruption issue.  
Finally, Part I.D briefly summarizes how states have criminalized corruption. 
 
 22. See infra Part I.B (discussing the cases fundamental to the Court’s narrow ruling in 
Kelly). 
 23. See, e.g., McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016); United States v. 
Blagojevich, 794 F.3d 729, 735 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 24. See Leah Litman, The Supreme Court Says Sorry, It Just Can’t Help with Political 
Corruption, ATLANTIC (May 8, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/05 
/supreme-court-embracing-deep-cynicism-about-world/611374/ [https://perma.cc/KH5P-
KWZM]. 
 25. See George D. Brown, McDonnell and the Criminalization of Politics, 5 VA. J. CRIM. 
L. 1, 22 (2017) (“Professor Zephyr Teachout has been quoted to the effect that the 
[McDonnell] decision ‘enshrine[s] bribery in our politics.’”(second alteration in original) 
(quoting Dante Ramos, Opinion, Va. Ex-governor Wins at Supreme Court, but Corruption Is 
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A.  What Is Corruption? 
When Benjamin Franklin accepted a diamond-encrusted snuffbox from 
King Louis XVI of France, Americans understood the danger that the 
luxurious gift posed to Franklin’s obligations to the United States.26  Even in 
1785, the public feared that the king’s gift would corrupt Franklin, causing 
him to favor the French king over his own country’s interests.27  The fear 
resulted in the Emoluments Clause of the Constitution, which is still used 
today to monitor foreign gifts to public officials.28 
Corruption is a broad concept that can be characterized in several ways.29  
Usually, it requires a violation of a rule in connection with personal or 
political gain.30  It can be defined as individuals with unique access to 
political power abusing that power and acting outside the range of behavior 
that is typically acceptable.31  This conduct often involves altering political 
outcomes due to the influence of wealth or gifts.32  Not necessarily a quid 
pro quo arrangement, corruption at its core involves secret deals that 
circumvent systems of political accountability.33  The only consistent factor 
defining corruption seems to be the harm that comes to citizens who have 
entrusted their well-being to elected officials.34 
This Note does not seek to offer a single definition of corruption.  It is a 
concept that has escaped definition in the courts and legislatures for years.35  
But no matter how it is defined, whether in the year 1785 or 2021, society 
understands that corruption is harmful to the democratic process and should 
be controlled. 
 
 26. See ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA 1–3 (2014).  For a picture of the 
diamond snuffbox, see Allen McDuffee, This Diamond Gift to Benjamin Franklin Is the 
Reason Donald Trump Can’t Profit from the Presidency, TIMELINE (Sept. 22, 2017), 
https://timeline.com/benjamin-franklin-emoluments-constitution-40339b04c159 [https:// 
perma.cc/CR83-8DZR]. 
 27. See TEACHOUT, supra note 26, at 2–3. 
 28. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8; TEACHOUT, supra note 26, at 27; see also Sharon 
LaFraniere, Appeals Court Allows Emoluments Suit Against Trump to Proceed, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/14/us/politics/trump-emoluments-clause-
fourth-circuit.html [https://perma.cc/RJ2D-6967]. 
 29. See Alexander K. Wilson, Note, Different Quids for Different Quos:  Why Congress 
Should Amend Anti-corruption Standards to Differentiate Between Campaign Contributions 
and Gratuities After McDonnell, 21 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 1033, 1033–35 (2019). 
 30. See Deborah Hellman, Defining Corruption and Constitutionalizing Democracy, 111 
MICH. L. REV. 1385, 1393 (2013). 
 31. See Jacob Eisler, McDonnell and Anti-corruption’s Last Stand, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1619, 1665 (2017). 
 32. See Samuel Issacharoff, Comment, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118, 
122 (2010).  Although Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), plays an important role 
in the federal corruption saga, this Note does not address Citizens United or the First 
Amendment implications of federal corruption laws.  Instead, its scope is limited to statutory 
interpretations and the rationale behind the Court’s more recent decisions regarding the honest 
services statute. 
 33. See Issacharoff, supra note 32, at 122. 
 34. See Eisler, supra note 31, at 1666–67. 
 35. See infra Part I.B (discussing the failure of the Court and Congress to officially define 
corruption). 
2344 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
B.  The History of Federal Corruption Law 
Originally passed in 1872 to address the sale of counterfeit currency 
through the mail,36 the mail fraud statute became one of the federal 
government’s most used instruments for combatting corrupt officials.37  
Congress amended the statute in 1901 to prohibit “any scheme or artifice to 
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent 
pretenses, representations, or promises.”38  In the 1940s, various circuit 
courts began to read the term “scheme or artifice to defraud” to include not 
only money or property but also a deprivation of “intangible rights.”39 
The “intangible rights doctrine” criminalized schemes that defrauded 
public and private entities of “intangible rights,” such as a public official’s 
loyalty and fiduciary services.40  By the 1980s, the intangible rights theory 
had been accepted by all the courts of appeals in cases of public corruption 
and schemes to defraud private parties.41 
Corruption prosecutions encountered a significant roadblock in 1987 when 
the Court severely limited the use of the mail fraud statute in McNally v. 
United States.42  The Court declined to extend the mail fraud statute to apply 
to a public official who accepted commissions for granting insurance 
companies the rights to administer Kentucky’s state insurance plans.43  In the 
1970s, Howard “Sunny” Hunt was chairman of the Kentucky Democratic 
Party and had de facto control over where the commonwealth would purchase 
its insurance policies.44  Hunt arranged a deal with the Wombwell Insurance 
Company where, in exchange for the state’s business, Wombwell would 
direct kickback commissions to companies of Hunt’s choice.45  In total, the 
Wombwell Insurance Company funneled $200,000 to a company controlled 
by Hunt and owned by petitioner Charles McNally.46 
Federal prosecutors charged McNally and Hunt with mail fraud under 18 
U.S.C. § 134147 based on the mailing of a commission check from one of the 
 
 36. Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights Doctrine:  Someone to 
Watch over Us, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 153, 158 (1994). 
 37. See generally Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (pt. 1), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 
771, 772–73 (1980). 
 38. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 399 (2010). 
 39. See generally Byung J. “BJay” Pak, Private Sector Honest Services Fraud 
Prosecutions After Skilling v. United States, DEP’T JUST. J. FED. L. & PRAC., Oct. 2018, at 149; 
see also Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110, 115 (5th Cir. 1941) (“No trustee has more 
sacred duties than a public official and any scheme to obtain an advantage by corrupting such 
an [sic] one must in the federal law be considered a scheme to defraud.”), overruled in part by 
U.S. v . Cruz, 478 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1973). 
 40. Peter M. Oxman, Note, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute After McNally v. United 
States, 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987):  The Remains of the Intangible Rights Doctrine and Its 
Proposed Congressional Restoration, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 743, 744 (1988). 
 41. See id. at 747–48. 
 42. 483 U.S. 350 (1987). 
 43. Id. at 356, 361. 
 44. Id. at 352. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 353. 
 47. At the time of the ruling, U.S.C. § 1341 provided that:   
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insurance companies to Wombwell.48  While fraudulent in nature, the Court 
found that the petitioners did not commit mail fraud because their conduct 
was not plainly within the statute.49 
The Court reasoned that it should only assume a harsher reading of a 
criminal statute when Congress has spoken in “clear and definite 
language.”50  If the prosecutors had shown a deprivation of property rights 
by dishonest methods or schemes, the Court would have been willing to apply 
the mail fraud statute.51  However, it declined to interpret every statute “in a 
manner that leaves its outer boundaries ambiguous” because it was not for 
federal officials to set “standards of disclosure and good government for local 
and state officials.”52  Congress needed to specifically set out what the statute 
criminalized for the Court to uphold the convictions.53 
Congress did not take long to respond.  In the following year, it enacted 18 
U.S.C. § 1346, a statute designed to cover the “intangible right of honest 
services” that the lower courts had relied on before McNally.54  Specifically, 
the honest services statute defined the term “scheme or artifice to defraud” 
to include “a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of 
honest services.”55 
The short but direct legislative history of § 1346 makes Congress’s intent 
abundantly clear.  Congress designed the amendment to “arm Federal 
prosecutors with the jurisdictional and investigative tools they must have to 
fight fraud and corruption—tools that effectively had been taken away by 
McNally.”56  It sought to restore the authority of U.S. attorneys to go after 
“vote-buyers, corrupt officials, and white-collar criminals.”57  Congress 
intended to return the state of corruption law to the pre-McNally 
interpretations of mail fraud statutes and the intangible rights theory.58 
For over twenty years, federal prosecutors enthusiastically accepted these 
congressional empowerments.  Despite criticisms that § 1346 was vague and 
an unconstitutional violation of federalist principles,59 circuit courts upheld 
 
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, 
or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, or promises, . . . for the purpose of executing such scheme or 
artifice or attempting so to do, [uses the mails or causes them to be used], shall be 
fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 
McNally, 483 U.S. at 352 n.1. 
 48. Id. at 353. 
 49. Id. at 361. 
 50. Id. at 359–60. 
 51. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27 (1987). 
 52. McNally, 483 U.S. at 360. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 402 (2010). 
 55. 18 U.S.C. § 1346. 
 56. See 134 CONG. REC. 32,639 (1988) (statement of Sen. Mitchell McConnell). 
 57. Id. 
 58. See 134 CONG. REC. S17,360 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1998) (statement of Sen. Joseph 
Biden) (“The intent is to reinstate all of the pre-McNally caselaw pertaining to the mail and 
wire fraud statutes without change.”). 
 59. Alex Hortis, Note, Valuing Honest Services:  The Common Law Evolution of Section 
1346, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1099, 1102 (1999). 
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the constitutionality of the statute and the use of an intangible rights theory.60  
The circuit courts interpreted the scope of conduct covered by the honest 
services statute to be extremely broad.61  Although most courts still required 
the alleged conduct to directly deprive the public of some entitlement, the 
government satisfied the honest services element once it established that a 
public official had engaged in “a scheme formed with the intent to defraud” 
the public of its right to “honest services.”62 
In 2010, the Supreme Court once again considered the definition of honest 
services, as revised under § 1346.63  And once again they interpreted the 
statute to constrain the federal government’s ability to prosecute 
corruption.64  In Skilling v. United States,65 the U.S. Department of Justice 
uncovered an elaborate scheme by Enron CEO Jeffrey Skilling to prop up the 
energy company’s short-run stock prices by fraudulently overstating Enron’s 
economic well-being.66  Federal prosecutors charged Skilling with 
conspiracy to commit securities and wire fraud, alleging that through his false 
representation of Enron’s well-being to public investors, Skilling had sought 
to “depriv[e] Enron and its shareholders of the intangible right of [his] honest 
services.”67 
Following the narrowing principles behind McNally, the Court reversed 
Skilling’s jury conviction and ruled that the “honest services” of the statute 
were aimed at those involving mail fraud, not fraudulent schemes in 
general.68  Although the Court recognized that Congress had reacted swiftly 
to amend the statute to override McNally, they agreed with Skilling’s 
argument that Congress did not speak clearly.69  To avoid striking down a 
congressional act as unconstitutionally vague, the Court chose to adopt its 
own construction of the statute, which limited its application to bribery and 
kickback schemes.70 
 
 60. See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 490 F.3d 1282, 1297 (11th Cir. 2007); United States 
v. Lopez-Lukis, 102 F.3d 1164, 1169 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that when a “political official 
uses his office for personal gain, he deprives his constituents of their right to have him perform 
his official duties in their best interest”); United States v. Catalfo, 64 F.3d 1070, 1077 (7th 
Cir. 1995) (holding that defrauding of the right to control risk of loss had substantial tangible 
value). 
 61. See, e.g., Walker, 490 F.3d at 1297; United States v. Potter, 463 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 
2006) (convicting a businessman for attempting to pay a legislator); United States v. Hasner, 
340 F.3d 1261, 1271 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (upholding the conviction of a local 
housing official who failed to disclose a conflict of interest); United States v. Rybicki, 354 
F.3d 124, 142 (2d Cir. 2003) (upholding the conviction of lawyers who paid an insurance 
adjuster to process their clients’ claims); United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 369 (6th Cir. 
1997) (upholding the conviction of students who colluded with their professor to plagiarize). 
 62. Walker, 490 F.3d at 1297. 
 63. See generally Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010). 
 64. See generally id. 
 65. 561 U.S. 358 (2010). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 369 (alteration in original) (quoting Joint Appendix at 318a, ¶ 87, Skilling, 560 
U.S. 358 (No. 08-1394)). 
 68. See Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565, 1572 (2020). 
 69. Skilling, 561 U.S. at 404. 
 70. See id. at 408. 
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In 2016, the Court reinforced the narrow interpretation of Skilling by 
vacating the conviction of former Virginia governor Robert McDonnell.71  
Federal prosecutors charged McDonnell with meeting with the CEO of a 
dietary supplement company to discuss using McDonnell’s office to 
implement research studies at Virginia public universities in exchange for 
gifts.72  These included:  offers to fly on private planes while campaigning,73 
an offer to buy an inauguration ball gown,74 a Rolex,75 the loaning of a 
Ferrari,76 and other loans and gifts totaling over $150,000.77 
McDonnell was charged with honest services fraud under 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1343 and 1349.78  The theory underlying the charges was that McDonnell 
had accepted bribes, so the parties agreed to define “honest services fraud” 
with reference to the federal bribery statute.79  The statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201, 
makes it a crime for a public official to receive anything of value in return 
for being “influenced in the performance of any official act.”80  Section 201 
subsequently defines “official act” to mean “any decision or action on any 
question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy” taken in a official 
capacity.81 
In the unanimous opinion, Chief Justice Roberts explained that holding 
meetings to consider a matter, such as undertaking a research study at a 
public university, did not qualify as an “official act” under § 201.82  An 
official act required the public official to “make a decision or take an action 
on that ‘question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy,’ or agree to 
do so.”83  Setting up a meeting to discuss holding an event, even with 
someone who has supplied the official with luxury gifts, does not qualify as 
such.84  Therefore, prosecutors improperly instructed the jury that the 
meeting was an “official act” and the Court overturned the conviction.85 
The McDonnell ruling significantly narrowed statutory interpretations of 
anti-corruption efforts.  The Court established that the question or 
controversy had to be “more specific and focused than a broad policy 
objective.”86  McDonnell’s conduct was undoubtedly “distasteful,” but the 
“tawdry tales of Ferraris, Rolexes, and ball gowns” were not the Court’s 
 
 71. See McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016). 
 72. Id. at 2361–62. 
 73. Id. at 2362. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 2363. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See id. at 2362–64. 
 78. Id. at 2365. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)). 
 81. 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3). 
 82. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2371. 
 83. Id. at 2372 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 201). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 2375. 
 86. Id. at 2374. 
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concern.87  Instead, the Court focused on limiting the boundaries of the 
federal government’s use of the federal bribery statutes.88 
The 2020 ruling in Kelly demonstrates that the Court remains committed 
to those limitations.  In the unanimous opinion, Justice Kagan explains that 
while the evidence clearly showed “deception, corruption, [and] abuse of 
power,” the federal laws did not cover closing lanes of traffic in political 
retaliation.89  Section 1343 criminalizes “any scheme or artifice to defraud, 
or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, or promises.”90  Federal prosecutors, therefore, had to prove 
property fraud.91  Prior cases before the Court92 emphasized that the 
government was not only required to show that Kelly and Baroni engaged in 
deception but also that money or property was the object of their fraud.93  
Since the retaliatory scheme provided neither actor with financial gain, their 
conduct was not criminal under § 1343.94 
C.  Efforts by Congress 
Congress has not completely taken a back seat as corrupt actors escape 
justice.  Following Skilling, both the U.S. House of Representatives and the 
Senate considered bills that would have expanded federal corruption 
jurisdiction.95  A 2012 House bill proposed to widen the definition of 
“official act” to include public official duties and increase the maximum 
sentence of imprisonment for breaking the law.96  In the same Congress, the 
Senate introduced and passed the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge 
or STOCK Act,97 which prohibited members of Congress from using 
information and influence gained through their positions for personal benefit.  
Although section 18 discusses “official acts,” the STOCK Act mostly 
addressed public officials leveraging confidential information in the stock 
market.98 
Of course, neither of these congressional efforts prevented the Court from 
reversing the conviction of Governor McDonnell, leaving a pothole for 
Congress to fill.  In 2018, Senator Elizabeth Warren introduced the Anti-
 
 87. Id. at 2375. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565, 1568 (2020). 
 90. 18 U.S.C. § 1343. 
 91. See Kelly, 140 S. Ct. at 1568. 
 92. See, e.g., Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 408–10 (2010); McNally v. United 
States, 483 U.S. 350, 358 (1987). 
 93. See Kelly, 140 S. Ct. at 1571. 
 94. Id. at 1568–69. 
 95. See MICHAEL A. FOSTER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45479, BRIBERY, KICKBACKS, AND 
SELF-DEALING:  AN OVERVIEW OF HONEST SERVICES FRAUD AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 23–24 
(2020); Stop Trading On Congressional Knowledge Act, Pub. L. No. 112-105, 126 Stat. 291 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.); see also H.R. 2572, 112th Cong. 
(2011).  
 96. H.R. 2572, §§ 5–8. 
 97. Pub. L. No. 112-105, 126 Stat. 291 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the 
U.S.C.). 
 98. See generally id. 
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Corruption and Public Integrity Act in the Senate.99  The bill, which proposed 
a variety of corruption regulations, restricted lobbyists’ ability to seek 
“official action” from members of Congress and Congress’s ability to accept 
gifts from lobbyists.100  Warren later acknowledged that she wanted to 
expand the definition of “official act” to close the “tractor-sized loophole” 
left by McDonnell.101  The bill ultimately died in a Republican-controlled 
Senate.102 
Although the bill failed to become law, politicians seemed to hear 
Warren’s call for better anti-corruption laws.  During the 2019 Democratic 
presidential primary, several candidates, including South Bend, Indiana, 
mayor Pete Buttigieg and Senator Amy Klobuchar, committed to passing 
anti-corruption laws early in their prospective tenures.103  The House 
followed up in 2019 with the For the People Act—a bill that sought to limit 
big money in politics and to enact stricter ethics rules for federal officials.104  
However, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell called the bill the 
“Democrat Politician Protection Act” and it never passed the Senate.105 
Shortly after Kelly, the Congressional Research Service published a report 
about honest services fraud and the cases that define it.106  It concluded that 
Congress should revisit the issue and consider the federalism and vagueness 
concerns that had previously halted progress.107 
D.  State Corruption Laws 
The Court’s limiting constructions have largely left public corruption 
policing to the states.108  In Kelly, Justice Kagan noted that New Jersey has 
its own official misconduct law, which prohibits the unauthorized use of 
official functions.109  Many states have similar laws aimed at policing official 
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misconduct and public corruption.110  These state laws make it illegal for 
public actors to obtain a “benefit” through the misuse of their official 
functions, setting a broader standard than the federal one.111 
Courts have disagreed on whether federal honest service charges have to 
be based on state law violations.112  Some courts have held that the honest 
services statute requires that a state official breach a state law duty rather than 
violate a federal definition of appropriate conduct.113  Other courts have 
disagreed, holding that the states do not have exclusive control over the ethics 
of official conduct.114  In the end, the Supreme Court declined to answer the 
question, instead opting to define “honest services” as requiring bribery and 
kickbacks.115 
II.  CROSSING TROUBLED WATERS:  VAGUENESS, FEDERALISM, AND 
CRIMINALIZING POLITICS 
The unanimous decisions in McDonnell and Kelly have seemingly 
cemented the notion that the Court will narrowly interpret statutes aimed at 
political corruption.  Principles of vagueness and federalism are often 
advanced as the constitutional foundations behind these decisions.  These 
principles’ influence is traceable throughout the case law.116  In many ways, 
these are two sides of the same coin:  the principles advance constitutional 
values limiting the federal government’s ability to prosecute crimes.  
However, the use of vagueness and federalism in unison has also led to a 
carveout for political actors that some have deemed “the critique of the 
criminalization of politics.”117 
Determining which side of the conceptual corruption bridge the Court 
lands on with these concerns in Kelly is crucial to Congress’s ability to 
combat corruption.  This part will explore the arguments made on both sides 
for these principles and examine how the courts applied those arguments in 
the aforementioned federal corruption cases.  Part II.A examines federalism 
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principles and how the Court has protected the states’ right to self-regulate.  
Part II.B discusses the use of the vagueness doctrine in corruption cases, 
including reliance on the rule of lenity and limitations on prosecutorial 
discretion.  Finally, Part II.C analyzes the “criminalization of politics” 
concept and the claim that the Supreme Court is protecting corrupt political 
activity from prosecution. 
A.  Federalism:  Balancing Federal and State Powers 
If you are wondering why corruption cases like Kelly and McDonnell are 
brought under obscure mail and property fraud statutes, you are not alone.118  
Often, they are the only authority that the federal government has to 
prosecute corruption.  The Constitution provides measures to limit corruption 
in the federal government, but it does not directly regulate corruption at the 
state level except through the grant of Congress’s enumerated powers.119  
None of these powers specifically grant the federal government police 
powers to address corruption by state officials.120  Congress must therefore 
use what powers it does have to impose laws aimed at corruption.  The postal 
power,121 the commerce power,122 and the spending power123 have become 
some of the main sources of authority for federal corruption laws.124 
Federalism in this context refers to the constitutional balance of federal 
and state power that guarantees and protects fundamental state liberties.125  
There are strict limitations on the power of the federal government to 
intervene in state and local affairs.  This is particularly prevalent in criminal 
law.126  Under the federal system, “[s]tates possess primary authority for 
defining and enforcing the criminal law.”127  Attempts to broadly define 
criminal statutes to include activity outside the delegated powers of Congress 
are therefore likely to be interpreted narrowly.128 
One of the main critiques of federal corruption prosecutions is that they 
usurp the power of the states and treat them as subordinates.129  Critics argue 
that the healthy balance of power promised by the federalist system is only 
maintained if the general police powers rest with the states, where they are 
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constitutionally reposed.130  The increase in federal crimes, especially those 
dealing with state affairs, upsets this constitutional balance.131 
Arguments for the defendants in these cases commonly invoke these 
federalist principles.  In general, petitioners argue federalism demands 
respect for the authority of states to govern their own officials.132  They claim 
the Court should be cautious in interpreting any law in a way that promotes 
a change in the federal-state balance, and should only do so when Congress 
has made its intent explicitly clear.133  When federal law does not capture an 
act, defendants argue that state laws and public perception are strong enough 
deterrents to curb corrupt behavior.134  All states have their own criminal 
corruption laws,135 many of which may be better equipped to handle state 
corruption.136  Petitioners and their supporters argue that the states should be 
responsible for dealing with their own officials.137 
The government conversely argues that the federalism concerns are not 
truly an issue in federal corruption cases.138  Federalism concerns can arise 
when Congress fails to clearly state its intentions.139  As the Court in McNally 
noted, if Congress wanted to reach corruption, it had to speak clearly.140  The 
government has argued that Congress did so by enacting the honest services 
statute in an intentional attempt to override McNally.141 
Even supporters of defendants’ arguments acknowledge that a restriction 
on the federal government’s ability to prosecute state actors might fail where 
a state has no corruption regulations.142  But what about when a state has 
corruption regulations but fails to use them?  The result might be similar to 
the Bridgegate scandal, where Christie-appointed prosecutors at the state and 
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county levels declined to bring charges against Christie or his staff,143 despite 
New Jersey’s anti-corruption law criminalizing their conduct.144 
This presents an important critique of the federalism defense.  There has 
been a long-recognized unwillingness of state and local prosecutors to 
commit their efforts to pursuing corruption charges that interest the federal 
government.145  This reluctance may become even more problematic when 
dealing with other government actors.  In essence, friends do not prosecute 
friends.  State governments may refuse to bring charges against state actors, 
especially those within the same political party.146  Take, for instance, the 
federal conviction of Robert Sorich, a former member of Chicago’s city 
government who was convicted under the honest services statute for granting 
thousands of civil service jobs based on political patronage and nepotism.147  
There is an obvious conflict of interest for a local prosecutor to pursue the 
very officeholder that appointed that individual.  Federal intervention may 
therefore be necessary to protect the federal government’s strong interest in 
promoting integrity at all levels of government.148  Ensuring that state and 
local officials perform their duties in the interest of their constituents, and not 
for personal benefit, is itself a fundamental federalist principle that the 
Supreme Court should protect.149 
The Court has held that these principles of federalism apply to vague 
federal statutes.150  Of course, McNally set a strong precedent when the Court 
 
 143. In 2016, a New Jersey Superior Court judge signed a criminal summons against 
Christie, ruling that there was probable cause to charge him with official misconduct. See 
Aliyah Frumin, Judge Finds Probable Cause to Probe Chris Christie Over Bridgegate, NBC 
NEWS (Oct. 13, 2016, 11:45 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/judge-finds-
probable-cause-probe-chris-christie-over-bridgegate-n665766 [https://perma.cc/A4T7-
NXUA].  State Attorney General Christopher Porrino recused himself shortly before the 
ruling. See Allison Pries, Judge Again Denies Request for Special Prosecutor in Christie Case, 
N. JERSEY (Dec. 23, 2016, 7:37 PM), https://www.northjersey.com/story/news/2016 
/12/23/judge-denies-motion-reconsider-rejection-special-prosecutor-christie-bridgegate-
case/95793480/ [https://perma.cc/2BQP-V8F5].  The day after the ruling’s announcement, 
Bergen County, New Jersey, prosecutor Gurbir Grewal, a Christie appointee, removed himself 
from the case as well and the charges were not brought. Id. 
 144. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:30-2 (West 2021) (prohibiting the “unauthorized exercise 
of official functions”). 
 145. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 369 (1983) (“Indeed, a recurring problem in this area (as 
well as in the related area of bribery of the administrators of such funds) has been that state 
and local prosecutors are often unwilling to commit their limited resources to pursue such 
thefts, deeming the United States the principal party aggrieved.”). 
 146. See Richard Messick, Where the Real Blame for Letting Bridgegate Defendants off 
Lies:  Part I, GLOBAL ANTICORRUPTION BLOG (May 20, 2020), 
https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2020/05/20/where-the-real-blame-for-letting-
bridgegate-defendants-off-lies-part-i [https://perma.cc/8PH5-SDLV] (“State prosecutors may 
be part of a tight-knit ruling elite and thus either profit directly from corruption or fear the 
reproach of friends and colleagues if they were to ‘upset the apple cart’ by going after corrupt 
members of the elite.”). 
 147. See United States v. Sorich, 523 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 148. See Henning, supra note 119, at 102. 
 149. See Brief of the Brennan Center for Justice at N.Y.U. School of Law as Amicus Curiae 
in Support of Respondent at 10, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-
474), 2016 WL 1388255, at *10. 
 150. See Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 859 (2014). 
2354 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
held that it was not for the federal government to set “standards of disclosure 
and good government for local and state officials.”151  Most subsequent 
decisions heavily adhere to this guiding principle. 
In McDonnell, the Court agreed with the defense that the government’s 
position raised “significant federalism concerns.”152  It is a state’s right to 
define its own sovereignty through the character of its officials.153  That right 
includes the discretion to regulate how officials are allowed to interact with 
constituents.154  Following the principle set forth in McNally, the Court in 
McDonnell narrowly interpreted “official act” to protect the states’ rights to 
set their own standards of government.155 
B.  Due Process and the Vagueness Doctrine 
A large portion of federal corruption decisions rest on the vague language 
used in fraud statutes.  The vagueness doctrine commonly incorporates two 
guiding principles to narrow criminal statutory language:  fair notice and 
limiting discriminatory prosecution.156 
1.  Fair Notice and the Rule of Lenity 
The vagueness doctrine generally holds that a criminal statute must 
sufficiently define the offense so that ordinary people can easily understand 
what conduct is prohibited.157  Based on the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments, the doctrine focuses on requiring legislatures 
to establish clear guidelines to govern law enforcement.158 
Due process is often tied to fair notice.  The fair notice standard requires 
that a statute “provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is 
prohibited.”159  When the average citizen does not know what is required 
under the law, courts may strike down statutes.160  The vagueness doctrine, 
therefore, guarantees that ordinary individuals can determine what acts are 
illegal with reasonable certainty.161 
The due process elements of the vagueness doctrine and, in particular the 
fair notice requirement, are foundational to the Court’s well-established 
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commitment to the rule of lenity.  When vagueness in a criminal statute 
creates more than one rational interpretation, the rule states that the Court 
should choose the option more favorable to the defendant.162  The Court uses 
the rule of lenity to ensure fair notice by construing statutes to criminalize 
only clearly covered conduct.163  Due process principles bar the Court from 
applying interpretations of statutes that are not clearly within congressional 
intent.164 
Defendants’ arguments in corruption cases rely heavily on precedent.  
They claim that the lack of clarity in the governing statutes leaves individuals 
such as McDonnell or Skilling without fair notice that they could be 
committing serious felonies.165  Defendants claim they were left guessing as 
to what conduct the federal statute covered, creating significant due process 
concerns in criminal proceedings.166  As McDonnell aptly argued, defendants 
“should not need to consult Nostradamus to know what federal law 
prohibits.”167 
Ambiguity may also extend beyond the language of the statute itself.  One 
of the justifications for the government’s broad interpretation of the honest 
services statute is that Congress’s quick statutory override of McNally shows 
it intended to return the statute to its pre-McNally usage.168  But defendants 
argue that simply referring to the state of the law pre-McNally is not enough, 
since the pre-McNally case law was an assortment of vague decisions.169  
They claim that the “jumble of disparate cases” construing the honest 
services statute in that era often produced inconsistent and conflicting results, 
leading to a variety of interpretations.170  The lack of a well-defined statute 
combined with the ambiguity of the pre-McNally case law leaves the federal 
corruption laws in a vague condition that provides no fair notice.171 
Where vague language blurs the line between what is lawful and unlawful, 
the rule of lenity may be invoked.172  Briefs favoring the defendants in these 
cases argue that lower courts ignore this well-established canon of 
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construction.173  Petitioners argue that the “jumble of cases” pre-McNally 
and the interpretations of the statutes since then show Congress’s failure to 
clearly define the conduct proscribed.174  This inconsistency leads to multiple 
interpretations, the harsher of which “trap the innocent.”175  When this is the 
case, petitioners argue the rule of lenity compels the Court to side with 
defendants and reverse convictions.176 
The Court in Skilling agreed with the defendant that the government’s 
interpretation of the honest services statute implicated significant vagueness 
issues.177  There was no doubt that Congress intended to reincorporate the 
pre-McNally intangible rights theory of fraud.178  However, the Court ruled 
that the pre-McNally theory was neither clear nor consistent.179  While pre-
McNally decisions regularly applied the fraud statute to bribery and kickback 
schemes, there was almost no consistent application of the statute to 
intangible rights.180  The Court reasoned that “Congress intended § 1346 to 
reach at least bribes and kickbacks” but widening the scope any further 
would raise due process concerns.181  Relying on pre-McNally applications 
to define the statute provided inadequate fair notice.182  Since the statute itself 
provides little guidance on the meaning outside the pre-McNally context, the 
Court ruled that the government’s broad interpretation would have left the 
statute impermissibly vague.183 
The Court in McDonnell also agreed that the government’s interpretation 
of the statute raised due process concerns.184  The Court recognized that 
“official act” is not defined with proper definiteness.185  It ruled that the lack 
of meaningful limits on “official act” allows the government to squeeze too 
much conduct into the statute’s coverage, some of which is otherwise 
lawful.186  Not only was the term vague but the definition prosecutors gave 
the jury also failed to provide any qualifications that limited the statute’s 
scope.187  The Court found that the government’s stance that all of 
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McDonnell’s acts qualified as official action created the type of baseless 
criminal prosecution that the Court has consistently rejected.188 
While acknowledging the vagueness concerns, the Court in both Skilling 
and McDonnell declined to strike down the honest services statute as 
unconstitutionally vague.189  In each case, the Court determined its 
interpretations of the statute avoided the constitutional vagueness concerns, 
allowing the statute to function with sufficient definiteness.190  Even Justice 
Thomas, who would have constitutionally invalidated the statute in 
Skilling,191 joined the unanimous decision in McDonnell refusing to do so.192  
By construing it narrowly rather than voiding the entire statute, the Court 
allowed the honest services statute to remain in place with “ample room for 
prosecuting corruption.”193 
2.  Limiting Prosecutorial Discretion 
The vagueness doctrine also serves the important role of limiting 
prosecutorial enforcement powers.194  Although fair notice is vital, the Court 
has recognized that preventing the arbitrary enforcement of the law is more 
important.195  It has ruled that overly vague statutes improperly give 
prosecutors and judges the ability to enforce and resolve law based on their 
own personal interpretations.196  It is the legislatures’ role, and not the courts’ 
or prosecutors’, to define criminality.197 
The defendants and their supporters argue that §§ 1343 and 1346 are so 
vague that they not only allow but encourage arbitrary enforcement.198  They 
claim that there is a significant constitutional problem when the only thing 
standing in the way of a felony indictment is the discretion of a federal 
prosecutor.199  Defendants argue that even where the prosecutors use such 
discretion wisely, the mere exercise of that discretion due to a vague statute 
is unconstitutional all the same.200  They claim that Congress cannot allow 
prosecutors and judges to dictate federal corruption law through intentionally 
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ambiguous statutes.201  If Congress wants to criminalize such conduct, it 
must do directly and speak clearly; it cannot delegate legislating to the courts 
and the discretion of prosecutors.202 
The Court in McDonnell agreed that the limits of a criminal statute should 
not be defined at the discretion of federal prosecutors.203  It could not allow 
the broad interpretation to stand in hopes that the government would wield 
excessive authority responsibly.204  The statute’s vagueness afforded 
prosecutors the discretion to define “official act” in any way they chose, and 
they chose to define it without any true bounds in violation of due process.205 
Skilling also recognized the concerns about “arbitrary and discriminatory 
prosecution” that often accompany a vague criminal statute.206  As with the 
fair notice concerns, the Court opted to “construe” rather than “condemn” 
Congress’s enactment.207  Using the newly minted interpretation of “honest 
services” as including only bribes and kickbacks, the Court reasoned that 
there was no true risk of arbitrary prosecution under the more confined 
definition.208  Once again, the Court avoided invalidating the entire statute 
by interpreting it in a way that maintained what the Court felt was Congress’s 
intended target. 
C.  The Criminalization of Politics 
Protections against vagueness and principles of federalism apply to all 
criminal cases and a wide variety of other scenarios.  However, when they 
combine to intervene in political affairs, they can form a third line of defense 
for political actors.  Some scholars refer to this as “the critique of the 
criminalization of politics.”209 
The critique contends that vague statutes allow courts and prosecutors to 
interpret laws, such as the mail fraud statute, in a way that “mak[es] everyday 
politics criminal.”210  It is not just a minor interference in state affairs but the 
federal government subordinating state officials.  This creates ample room 
for abuse, such as creating politically motivated traps for unwary 
politicians211 or halting political interaction altogether.212 
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Critics argue that this interference can have serious negative implications 
for government functions.  Governing is not easy work, and there are 
inevitable trade-offs that are necessary to public office.213  Dealmaking and 
“back-scratching” have become essential components of American politics 
and are often used rationally to get the ball rolling on legislation.214  If 
anything, critics argue these practices may be evidence of a “healthy political 
system, not a corrupt one.”215  Essentially, if everyone is doing it, how can it 
be that bad? 
Although corruption prosecutions are presumably aimed at creating a 
better government, defendants argue they may do the exact opposite.  Federal 
corruption prosecutions make state and local officials more accountable to 
the federal government than to those who voted for them.216  The mere threat 
of federal prosecution and years in jail217 may scare off extensive interaction 
and compromise.218  In this way, attempts to curb police corruption and 
punish bad actors in the political system may have the ironic effect of 
negatively impacting healthy government functioning.219 
Critics of criminalizing politics argue that, until Congress speaks more 
clearly on the issue, local political corruption should be left to the states in 
which the political actors are directly involved.220  They assert that the broad 
limits of federal corruption law have left “headline-grabbing prosecutors in 
pursuit of local officials, state legislators, and corporate CEOs” with the 
autonomy to interpret the law to cover whichever actions they desire.221  This 
federal interference violates both due process and federalist principles, 
forming a double violation that the courts should protect against. 
Cases that accede to these arguments have been read as creating a 
constitutional shield for political corruption, allowing abusers of power to 
insulate themselves from federal prosecution using principles of vagueness 
and federalism.222  Professor Zephyr Teachout has expressed concern that 
the McDonnell decision effectively “enshrined bribery in our politics.”223 
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The language of the critique is prominent in the briefs supporting 
McDonnell.  Petitioners argue that vaguely defined corruption statutes pose 
particularly “grave dangers” for political figures.224  The way the government 
attempts to apply honest services statutes allows prosecutors to investigate 
and indict any official they want.225  Petitioners claim that any political 
dealing can be turned into a serious felony.226  The discretion would allow 
prosecutors to target political adversaries, permanently changing the 
American political landscape.227  Some supporters go so far as to compare 
politicians to other historically targeted groups, such as civil rights leaders in 
the 1960s.228 
McDonnell and those in his corner claim that the “chilling effect” that this 
threat would have on political participation could upend the government 
process.229  Using § 1343 to criminalize routine political actions would cast 
a shadow over political dealings and discourage beneficial interactions.230  
Every meeting with another politician or lobbyist would have to be second-
guessed for fear of committing a federal felony.231  Even if the Court 
consistently overturns convictions, they argue the mere ability of prosecutors 
to bring serious charges could completely derail the political logrolling 
central to American democracy.232  Exercising political influence with 
constituents is not explicitly criminalized by the law,233 and petitioners argue 
that to stretch the honest services statutes to capture such conduct robs 
constituents of their democratic right to support candidates who share their 
beliefs.234 
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The McDonnell decision justifiably raises concerns that the Court would 
protect corrupt political dealings.  The language of the critique can be found 
throughout the decision, much of it taken directly from the briefs.  The Court 
directly agreed with the petitioners that “breathtaking expansion of public-
corruption law would likely chill federal officials’ interactions with the 
people they serve and thus damage their ability effectively to perform their 
duties.”235  Representative government requires that public officials 
communicate with their constituents and use their positions to tend to their 
concerns.236  The Court expressed significant concern that the government’s 
interpretation of the statute would damage the ability of officials to perform 
these duties.237 
According to the Court, McDonnell was a case about interpreting the 
meaning of “official act” as part of a vague statute.238  However, in 
interpreting the statute, the Court echoed the concerns of McDonnell and his 
supporters that “typical” political dealings should not fall within the 
interpretation, at least not without Congress’s express indication.239  The 
Court applied a narrow reading of “official act” that enforced what it 
conceived as meaningful limits on its interpretation by the government.240  It 
found that a “cause, suit, proceeding or controversy” involved only “formal 
exercises of governmental power.”241  The Court ruled that the entire statute 
captured formal proceedings, such as lawsuits, congressional trials, and 
legislative votes, but not “typical” meetings that a public official regularly 
encounters.242  Doing so avoided the “absurdities” of convicting public 
officials for holding meetings or speaking with constituents.243 
Although the Court acknowledged that McDonnell’s actions were far from 
typical constituent interaction, it nonetheless feared that upholding the 
government’s interpretation would allow prosecutors to reach beyond 
exchanges of high-value gifts and into normal political conduct.244  The 
Court was concerned that the government simply could not be trusted to 
prosecute responsibly when armed with such a vague statute.245 
The Court considered vagueness- and federalism-related concerns, but it 
analyzed their constitutional implications separately from the political 
considerations.246  It appears the Court is using the doctrines as constitutional 
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support beams for the political criminalization argument, attaching the 
statutory interpretations to foundational constitutional theorems that are more 
well established.247  Under this view, the Court seems to create the 
implication that it is not just applying these constitutional standards but 
creating a third line of defense for public officials. 
III.  ANOTHER ROADBLOCK IN THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS?:  THE 
IMPLICATIONS OF KELLY  
Prior federal corruption cases have developed strong precedents with 
regard to federalism, vagueness, and the criminalization of politics.  Mainly, 
the Court has established that it will protect the states’ sovereign right to self-
regulate, will not allow prosecutors to expand their jurisdiction based on 
vague statutes, and may be hesitant to criminalize what it considers to be 
routine political behavior.  The question becomes where Kelly lands on each 
issue.  Although Kelly reflects many of the concerns of McDonnell and 
Skilling, in the end, the opinion seems to stop short of condoning the corrupt 
behavior. 
Part III seeks to determine where the Court currently stands on federal 
corruption in the wake of Kelly.  Part III.A analyzes Kelly using the same 
principles as the other cases:  vagueness, federalism, and the criminalization 
of politics.  It discusses how the decision handles each of these principles in 
turn and compares them to McDonnell and Skilling to outline trends in the 
law.  Part III.B then applies those trends to propose amendments to the 
federal law that would capture corruption while addressing the Court’s true 
concerns. 
A.  Application to Kelly 
Part III.A.1 applies the federalism principles used in other federal 
corruption cases to Kelly.  Part III.A.2 follows by analyzing the case under 
the vagueness doctrine.  Finally, Part III.A.3 examines the criminalization of 
politics argument in Kelly. 
1.  Federalism 
In Kelly, the abuse of the Port Authority and its interstate facilities 
presented a unique federalism issue for the Court.  The mail and wire fraud 
statutes used to prosecute Kelly and Baroni were enacted pursuant to 
Congress’s interstate commerce powers.248  Therefore, their conduct needed 
to involve interstate commerce for the statute to be validly applied.  In Kelly, 
the use of the Port Authority, an interstate agency created by Congress,249 to 
interfere with a bridge crossing from one state to another seemed to implicate 
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interstate commerce.  It is therefore perhaps unsurprising that the Third 
Circuit rejected the federalism concerns presented by Kelly and Baroni.250 
Despite arguments from Kelly that this rejection was ill founded,251 the 
Supreme Court did not address the federalism issue in Kelly.252  Such silence 
implies that the Court felt that charging Kelly and Baroni under the statute 
was an appropriate exercise of federal power.  When interstate commerce is 
so blatantly involved, using the mail and wire fraud statutes is possible. 
That is not to say that Kelly did not present other federalism issues.  Like 
in McDonnell, the Kelly Court expressed concerns over the federal 
government interfering with a state’s sovereignty.253  Kelly and Baroni 
exercised a regulatory power, part of a state’s “traditional police powers.”254  
One of the driving forces behind the Court’s narrowed definition of property 
was the often-cited McNally principle:  “Federal prosecutors may not use 
property fraud statutes to ‘set[] standards of disclosure and good government 
for local and state officials.’”255  The Court reasoned that if it allowed 
“property fraud” to reach Kelly’s conduct, then it would be permitting a 
broad expansion of the federal criminal law into matters that are reserved for 
the states.256  This reasoning seemingly extended the McDonnell ruling that 
states have the sovereign right to define for themselves how and when 
officials may exercise governmental powers.257 
The states’ prerogative to regulate themselves seems to be a principle that 
the Court upholds in federal corruption matters.  Of course, there are subtle 
differences in the federalism concerns.  McDonnell deals with a state’s ability 
to control its own actors, while Kelly is more focused on states’ exercise of 
police powers.258  However, both decisions are rooted in the federalism 
principle that the states must be free to regulate themselves and their 
officials.259  The Court made clear in each case that the federal government 
does not have the authority to leave the outer boundaries of its criminal 
statutes ambiguous to create a broad expanse of federal jurisdiction over state 
actors.260 
Professor George Brown argues that Kelly invites a rethinking of the role 
federalism plays in the anti-corruption saga.261  He concludes that Kelly 
 
 250. Id. at 575. 
 251. See Brief for Petitioner at 17, Kelly, 140 S. Ct. 1565 (No. 18-1059), 2019 WL 
4568203, at *17. 
 252. See generally Kelly, 140 S. Ct. 1565. 
 253. Id. at 1572. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. at 1574 (alteration in original) (quoting McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 
360 (1987)). 
 256. Id. 
 257. See supra notes 152–54 and accompanying text. 
 258. Kelly, 140 S. Ct. at 1572–73. 
 259. See id. at 1574 (quoting McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987)); 
McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2373 (2016). 
 260. See Kelly, 140 S. Ct. at 1574; McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2373. 
 261. See George D. Brown, Defending Bridgegate, 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 141, 
176–77 (2020). 
2364 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
implies that federal prosecutors should no longer play the lead role that they 
currently do in the corruption model.262  Although it is admittedly difficult 
to envision how this might work, Brown acknowledges there are plenty of 
opportunities to narrow the role of the federal government.263 
While the Court clearly promotes a more narrow role for the federal 
government, it is not clear that it is calling for the erasure of federal 
prosecutors as the lead in corruption prosecutions.  It certainly poses the 
question for legislatures that McNally and its predecessors have consistently 
reinforced:  how can the federal government regulate the standards of state 
actors without setting those standards?264  Nevertheless, immediately ruling 
out the ability of federal prosecutors to bring corruption charges would 
unnecessarily limit the options available to a Congress attempting to solve an 
already restricted issue.  More importantly, federal intervention may be 
crucial in cases involving state and local actors where local authorities may 
otherwise not act.265  Kelly focuses on the federal government interfering 
with state regulatory powers but stops short of saying that federal prosecutors 
should refrain from pursuing corruption charges.  This distinction may be 
critical to future drafts of the law, and it is one of the reasons why Kelly, as 
even Brown notes, could be celebrated rather than chalked up to a win for 
corruption.266 
2.  Vagueness 
Despite being raised in charges under a different statute, the vagueness 
components of Kelly appear very similar to those raised in McDonnell and 
Skilling.  In particular, the Court’s narrowing of “property” is analogous to 
the “official act” interpretation in McDonnell.267  The Kelly “property” 
definition also relies on the Skilling principle requiring actual transfer of 
something of monetary value rather than violations of intangible rights.268 
Although the decision does not directly reference the vagueness doctrine, 
vagueness principles can be found throughout.  In Kelly, the Court found that 
the government’s definition of “property” would impermissibly expand the 
reach of federal prosecutors.269  Interpreting the normal meaning of the 
words, Kelly and Baroni did not “commandeer” state “property” in their 
scheme270 any more than McDonnell undertook an “official act” by holding 
a meeting.271  To prevent overreaching prosecutors from criminalizing 
conduct that is not clearly within the statute, the Court applied a very narrow 
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interpretation of “property,” directly addressing the vagueness doctrine’s 
prosecutorial discretion protections.272 
In Skilling, the Court already decided that “intangible rights” were not 
within the core scope of the mail and wire fraud statutes.273  In establishing 
the bribery and kickback requirement, the Court made it clear:  the law 
dictates that to prosecute based on corrupt acts, an offical must have received 
tangible benefits.274 
Kelly holds to this principle.  In Kelly, the Court drew a firm line between 
“property” and what it deemed to be an exercise of regulatory power.275  
Section 1341 requires the object of the fraud to be actual property in the 
hands of the victim, not the state’s exercise of its police powers.276  The Court 
ruled that Kelly and Baroni exercising the state prerogative to realign traffic 
lanes did not involve such tangible property.277  They did not pick up the 
lanes and take them or convert them for personal use.278  They undoubtedly 
exercised their authority for malicious reasons, but all they did was “alter a 
regulatory decision,” not take property.279  Just as the Court in Skilling found 
that undisclosed self-dealing did not qualify as a bribe or a kickback and 
therefore was outside the scope of § 1346,280 Kelly found that “property” in 
§ 1343 simply did not include the use of regulatory power.281 
The Kelly Court did not limit its narrow interpretation to solely the word 
“property.”  It doubled down and made it as clear as possible that in no way 
could what Kelly and Baroni did be interpreted as taking the state’s 
property.282  The Court held that under § 1343, property must not only play 
a role in the fraud—it must be the “object of the fraud.”283  It reasoned that 
the “object” of Kelly and Baroni’s fraud was not to take the Port Authority’s 
property—in this case, the wages of Port Authority employees—but to carry 
out their scheme.284  They did not care about Port Authority labor or seek to 
obtain its services.285  Labor costs were merely a byproduct of their lies, not 
a sufficient basis on which to uphold the convictions.286 
The Kelly opinion’s devotion to clarifying the language of the statute 
reflects the most consistent trend in federal corruption cases.  The vagueness 
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argument is at the foundation of McNally, Skilling, and McDonnell.287  
Although the Court does not explicitly cite the vagueness doctrine, its 
influence nonetheless appears in Kelly.  The Court will not allow federal 
prosecutors to stretch the meaning of federal statutes to reach conduct that 
Congress did not clearly intend.288  When forced to decide between two 
interpretations, such as whether holding a meeting is an official act or not or 
if closing lanes is taking property, it will err on the side of lenity and employ 
a narrow construction of the statutes.289 
What is not present in Kelly may be just as important as what is.  Like in 
Skilling and McDonnell, the Court did not strike down the statute as 
unconstitutionally vague.290  In Kelly, the Court utilized statutory elements 
rather than constitutional ones to confine the boundaries of the statute.291  It 
presents some hope for prosecutors in future proceedings.  The mail and wire 
fraud statutes are independently constitutional; their language just does not 
capture the conduct that the federal government wants them to in these 
instances. 
If provided with a statute properly tailored to the specific conduct, it is 
more than possible that the Court would uphold federal corruption 
convictions.  The Kelly decision seems carefully written not to overextend 
the application of the holding.  For example, with reference to § 1343, Justice 
Kagan emphasized that a “state or local official’s fraudulent schemes violate 
that law only when, again, they are ‘for obtaining money or property.’”292  
The Court agreed that what Kelly and Baroni did should not be protected but 
ruled that their conduct did not specifically violate the federal program fraud 
or wire fraud laws.293  The government had to prove property fraud, and it 
failed to do so.294  Kelly, therefore, reads less as a constitutional bar to federal 
prosecutions and more as a plea for congressional action. 
Prosecutors’ hands nonetheless appear to be tied until Congress changes 
the federal corruption laws in this respect.  The government can continue 
trying to wiggle around the narrow standards set in Skilling and reinforced 
through McDonnell and Kelly,295 but the Court has now established a strong 
precedent that it will take the narrow road and crack down on those attempts. 
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3.  Criminalization of Politics 
Just as in McDonnell, the criminalization argument is present in the Kelly 
briefs.296  Robert McDonnell himself submitted a brief in support of Kelly 
and Baroni,297 and the petitioner’s brief even uses the “chilling” language 
from the McDonnell decision in one of its argument headings.298  The Court 
therefore once again faced an opportunity to condone the corrupt behavior 
on constitutional grounds. 
Despite such opportunity, Kelly seems to tread on the perimeter of the 
criminalization argument without actually committing to the constitutional 
shield that McDonnell appeared to implement.  The Court is indeed 
concerned with the federal government criminalizing state actions that are 
well within the traditional powers of the state.299  It recognized that 
governance involves many regulatory choices and allowing the federal 
government to criminalize all lies would undercut the previously established 
standards of the Court.300  This sounds strikingly similar to the criminalizing-
everyday-politics arguments made, and seemingly endorsed, in 
McDonnell.301 
However, Kelly turned on the statutory boundaries of “property.”302  What 
conduct the federal government could constitutionally prosecute did not fuel 
the decision.  The Court was mostly worried about property statutes being 
used to prosecute state actions that fell outside the statutes’ reasonable 
interpretations.303 
This represents a significant departure from McDonnell.  Some read the 
McDonnell decision as the Court normalizing the corrupt actions of officials 
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by using political discourse to support its narrow interpretations.304  In the 
course of interpreting “official act,” McDonnell weaves the criminalization 
critiques into the constitutional arguments.305  The McDonnell Court is not 
only focused on the expansion of federal jurisdiction reaching the decisions 
of state officials.306  It is also concerned about the chilling effect such 
convictions would have on the general political atmosphere.307  In other 
words, the Court is not just worried about an overreaching criminal statute; 
it is also worried that the reach will stop public officials from politicking.  
While McDonnell’s political actions were not “normal,” the McDonnell 
Court was hesitant to potentially criminalize any form of political activity.308 
Kelly is not nearly as enthusiastic about protecting the everyday behavior 
of politicians.  It confines its analysis to what property fraud statutes can and 
cannot do.309  Federal attorneys were not restricted from prosecuting corrupt 
state officials because it would chill political behavior but because it is not 
what property fraud statutes are for.310  According to the Court, those statutes 
bar schemes aimed at obtaining property, nothing more and nothing less.311 
The distinction here is key to understanding where the Court now stands 
on federal corruption.  As Justice Kagan notes, what Kelly and Baroni did 
was an abuse of power, but “not every corrupt act by state or local officials 
is a federal crime.”312  The Court has made abundantly clear that corrupt acts 
will not constitute a federal crime under property fraud statutes.  Kelly does 
not imply that all politics are off-limits to federal prosecutors.  They just need 
something more direct than wire fraud laws.313 
B.  Building the Bridge:  How Congress Can Get over the Federal 
Corruption Issue 
This section analyzes the impact that the Kelly decision will have on 
federal policymaking and how Congress can amend the law to conform with 
the Court’s decisions.  Part III.B.1 summarizes how Kelly dealt with each 
concept above to determine a direction for the Court moving forward.  Part 
III.B.2 then proposes that Congress amend the honest services statute to 
define honest services violations with reference to state corruption laws. 
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1.  The Court’s Expectations for Corruption Law After Kelly 
Kelly does not represent a victory for U.S. anti-corruption regulation.  The 
Court overturned the corruption convictions and in the process, removed 
another viable federal prosecution tool.  However, the rationale behind the 
decision may have paved a path forward to enact more comprehensive anti-
corruption legislation. 
As in previous cases, the Kelly Court once again ruled that Congress must 
provide clear legislation that shows that federal statutes are intended to reach 
specific conduct, such as that at issue in Kelly.314  Federal prosecutors have 
attempted to prosecute corruption under the mail fraud statute in a variety of 
ways, but the Court has consistently rejected those arguments under 
vagueness and federalism principles.315  Prosecutors can continue to 
experiment with interpretations of property fraud316 or bribery statutes317 but, 
given their lack of success, legislative action is a more practical solution. 
There is already a congressional appetite to draft legislation that deals with 
federal corruption.318  Amending the honest services statute to incorporate 
the Court’s rulings in Kelly, McDonnell, and Skilling would be a viable 
legislative solution.319  However, Congress will have to carefully tailor any 
legislation to meet the standards the Court established in these recent cases. 
To start, Congress needs to adhere to the Court’s vagueness concerns by 
narrowing the scope of the honest services statute.  Congress has never 
defined “honest services,”320 leaving the Court to develop its own definition 
using the bribery and kickback requirements.321  The Court’s reluctance to 
strike down the statute as unconstitutionally vague shows that it does not 
want to invalidate the statute, but it will require meaningful boundaries for 
“honest services” to satisfy vagueness requirements.322  A congressional 
enactment will need to properly limit the statute’s scope to sufficiently define 
“honest services” and prevent prosecutorial overreach. 
There are also definite federalism concerns to be addressed. The Kelly 
decision furthers the Court’s protection of states’ ability to self-regulate.323  
However, this does not completely prevent congressional intervention.  Kelly 
does not represent a total bar for federal prosecutors to bring charges against 
corrupt state actors.  To succeed, prosecutors will need a congressional 
enactment that not only defines the boundaries of the law but also respects 
the federal-state balance and the ability of states to maintain their regulatory 
powers. 
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While the Kelly Court did focus on federalism and vagueness concerns, it 
did not focus on the “criminalization of politics” and neither should 
Congress.  Kelly showed that the Court is not necessarily concerned with 
criminalizing political conduct so long as the criminalization adheres to well-
established vagueness and federalism principles.  If a statute clearly defines 
corrupt conduct and allows the states to maintain their ability to self-regulate, 
the Court is unlikely to extend protections to corrupt political actions.  If 
Congress narrows the scope of the honest services statute to comport with 
the federalism and vagueness principles, the Court will likely allow 
corruption convictions under the statute to stand. 
2.  The Bridge Less Traveled:  Defining Honest Services with Reference to 
State Law 
The key to improving the honest services statute will be defining “honest 
services” with clarity to narrow its scope while still maintaining the 
regulatory sovereignty of the states.  Congress should consider an 
amendment that both allows states to set their own standards for officials and 
simultaneously grants the federal government the ability to enforce those 
standards. 
Most states not only have corruption laws but have very well-written and 
specific ones.324  Recall New Jersey’s official misconduct law, which 
prohibits the “unauthorized exercise of . . . official functions.”325  If state 
prosecutors brought the charges against Kelly and Baroni under this statute, 
the Court implied that their conduct likely would have fallen within its 
scope.326  However, state officials did not bring the charges, highlighting the 
concern that local officials are unlikely to prosecute their peers.327  Because 
it was a state law, the federal government was unable to bring the charges, 
leaving a gap in the law that Kelly and Baroni were fortunate enough to fall 
into. 
Congress should bridge this gap by drafting an amendment allowing the 
federal law to define “honest services” with reference to state law.  Defining 
federal law with reference to state violations is not a new concept, even 
within federal corruption law.  A McNally footnote explains that the honest 
services statute is self-contained and therefore relies only on itself to define 
its content.328  The Court then provides an example of a federal statute that, 
relying on the interstate commerce power, references state law to criminalize 
interstate gambling and prostitution.329  The footnote details that § 1952(b) 
of the Travel Act330 defines the broad term “unlawful activity” with reference 
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to state law.331  The statute defines “unlawful activity” to include, among 
other things, extortion, bribery, and arson in violation of the law of the state 
where the conduct occurred.332 
Although the Travel Act defines “unlawful activity” using state statutes, 
the Court has still granted federal prosecutors some discretion as to how to 
apply the law.  For example, the state statute only needs to cover a generic 
definition of the alleged conduct.  In United States v. Nardello,333 the Court 
found that a state blackmail law could be used in a federal extortion 
indictment because the blackmail statute included “a type of activity 
generally known as extortionate.”334  The Court determined that when an act 
prohibited by state law falls within a generic definition of extortion, it 
constitutes an “unlawful act” under the Travel Act.335  The Court reiterated 
that the Nardello decision leaves little uncertainty about the Travel Act’s 
meaning and therefore dismissed federalism and rule of lenity concerns in 
Perrin v. United States.336  The Travel Act represented Congress’s deliberate 
intent to change the federal-state balance to enforce both state violations and 
federal bribery law in one swoop.337  Until the Travel Act impeded a 
constitutional provision, the Court would leave its construction to 
Congress.338 
Of course, the scope of the Travel Act is not unlimited.  Not every unlawful 
activity qualifies as “unlawful activity” under the Act; it is only those 
activities specifically provided in the statute involving liquor, narcotics, 
controlled substances, gambling, prostitution, arson, bribery, or extortion.339  
The statute merely allows the government to use the state definitions of these 
individual crimes.  Further, the conduct must still fit within a generic 
definition of the crime.  For example, in Scheidler v. National Organization 
for Women, Inc.,340 the Court reversed a conviction under the Travel Act 
because the conduct did not fit within the common definition of extortion.341  
The defendants did not obtain or attempt to obtain property and therefore did 
not commit extortion.342  The Travel Act also requires that mail or interstate 
facilities actually be used to promote the unlawful activity, limiting its effect 
on intrastate governance.343 
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Despite the limitations, the Travel Act still provides federal prosecutors 
with the necessary flexibility to police acts that toe the line with respect to 
the delicate federal-state balance.  Congress should take a similar approach 
with the honest services statute.  Lower courts have considered in the past 
whether or not the definition of “honest services” must comply with state 
laws.344  A congressional enactment answering the question in the 
affirmative would be a natural progression in the development of the law. 
Following the structure of the Travel Act, Congress should amend § 1346 
to include another provision defining “honest services,” similar to the way 
the Travel Act defines “unlawful activity.”345  The amendment would utilize 
state official misconduct laws to define honest services in a way that reaches 
political corruption.346  Such a provision might read: 
As used in this section “honest services” means extortion, bribery, or 
official misconduct in violation of the laws of the state in which committed 
or of the United States. 
Adding such a provision would be an effective cure to the ailments that have 
plagued federal corruption prosecutions.  To deal with vagueness concerns, 
the amendment would constitute a clear action by Congress, defining the 
conduct it intends to proscribe.  Instead of leaving “honest services” open to 
the interpretation of federal prosecutors, this amendment would properly 
limit the scope of honest services by limiting it to bribery, extortion, or state 
official misconduct violations. 
The defining provision also clarifies the covered conduct by comporting 
with current understandings of the law.  The Court already uses bribery and 
kickbacks as the defining parameters of “honest services.”347  Drafting the 
amendment to include bribery and extortion credits the Court’s previous 
rulings, rather than overriding them.348  By adding rather than replacing, 
Congress would make its intentions clear:  it intends to make both bribery 
and the abuse of official regulatory powers illegal.  As with the Travel Act, 
the use of clear language to show what Congress intends will likely prevent 
successful challenges to the statute based on the rule of lenity and the 
vagueness doctrine.349  If Congress wants to criminalize corrupt actions, it 
needs to speak clearly, and this amendment would do just that.  It would 
properly limit the statute’s scope to sufficiently define the criminal conduct 
and prevent prosecutorial overreach. 
The amendment also addresses federalism concerns.  Defining “honest 
services” with reference to state law prevents federal prosecutors from setting 
standards of good governance for states by using the standards states set 
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themselves.350  The law would grant federal prosecutors the ability to target 
corruption but preserve the states’ ability to determine what qualifies as 
“official misconduct” and what does not.  States would thus retain the power 
to control what conduct their officials may be held liable for.  If the law were 
to follow the same path as the Travel Act, the reservation of state regulatory 
power and the clear congressional intent of the amendment should extinguish 
the federalism and rule of lenity concerns. 
As with any proposal, there are drawbacks to this amendment.  For one, 
defining “honest services” using “official misconduct” may be trading one 
vague term for another.  Some state courts have debated how “official 
misconduct” is defined within statutes.351  The main question that arises is 
what qualifies as the public official’s “duty” and what types of actions 
amount to “official misconduct.”352  Despite the Court’s flexibility in 
applying “generic” definitions of extortion and bribery to the Travel Act, 
these terms have relatively well-understood meanings tied to property or 
monetary gain.  Perhaps this is why the Court chose to define “honest 
services” using bribery.353  An “official misconduct” definition may 
therefore raise the same vagueness issues as “honest services.” 
However, even though there are vagueness concerns with “official 
misconduct,” the term is still not as vague as “honest services” and should 
not be enough to condemn the proposed amendment.  While courts have 
struggled to define “honest services,”354 they have successfully defined 
“official misconduct” using statutes, codes of conduct, and other well-
defined regulations.355  Unlike the possibly boundless scope of “honest 
services,” courts have dismissed charges under “official misconduct” that fail 
to establish that a set of rules prohibit the official’s actions.356  “Official 
misconduct” therefore offers enough guidance to provide the meaningful 
limits to the law that “honest services” has failed to produce. 
CONCLUSION 
Kelly is not a win for anti-corruption efforts, but it does represent a 
potential guidepost to lead future attempts to police corrupt public officials.  
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The Supreme Court’s decision applies reasoning consistent with previous 
cases focused on vagueness and federalism concerns but stops short of 
normalizing the misconduct.  The decision provides Congress with the 
necessary structure to enact new federal corruption laws that reach the 
conduct in Kelly and previous cases without upsetting well-established 
constitutional principles. 
One option would be to amend § 1346 to define “honest services” using 
state laws.  This would create a balance between the need to define the 
prohibited conduct and the right of the states to self-regulate.  Despite its 
possible limitations, the amendment would be a simple way for Congress to 
provide federal prosecutors a viable statute to combat corruption while 
accounting for the Supreme Court’s concerns.  Given the history of the 
Court’s interpretations, such an amendment is the best option to solve the 
ongoing corruption issue.  Kelly shows that it will take Congress “speaking 
clearly” on corruption to successfully prosecute corrupt acts at the federal 
level.  Congress should take the hint and enact an amendment to the honest 
services statute. 
Citizens understand that political corruption at all levels has negative 
implications for society.  The public has a natural expectation that when it 
elects officials, those official will serve the public’s interest and not their 
own.  When corrupt conduct such as occurred in the Bridgegate scandal goes 
unpunished, it undermines the foundations of American democracy and 
permanently leaves marks of distrust on the government.  The United States 
needs to solve the federal corruption issue that has been evolving in the courts 
for over forty years in a way that fits within democratic principles.  The Court 
has created the roadmap to do so through decisions like Kelly.  It is now up 
to Congress to build the bridge and finally close the gap between public 
expectations and federal corruption prosecutions. 
